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Abstract: To attain improved human-machine collaboration, it is necessary for autonomous
systems to infer human trust and workload and respond accordingly. In turn, autonomous
systems require models that capture both human trust and workload dynamics. In a companion
paper, we developed a trust-workload partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
model framework that captured changes in human trust and workload for contexts that involve
interaction between a human and an intelligent decision-aid system. In this paper, we defne
intuitive reward functions and show that these can be readily transformed for integration with
the proposed POMDP model. We synthesize a near-optimal control policy using transparency as
the feedback variable based on solutions for two cases: 1) increasing human trust and reducing
workload, and 2) improving overall performance along with the aforementioned objectives for
trust and workload. We implement these solutions in a reconnaissance mission study in which
human subjects are aided by a virtual robotic assistant in completing a series of missions. We
show that it is not always benefcial to aim to improve trust; instead, the control objective should
be to optimize a context-specifc performance objective when designing intelligent decision-aid
systems that infuence trust-workload behavior.

© 2019, IFAC (International Federation of Automatic Control) Hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: trust in automation, human-machine interface, intelligent machines, Markov
decision processes, stochastic modeling, parameter estimation, dynamic behavior
1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing use of autonomous and intelligent
systems, humans must interact and collaborate with these
systems in both complex situations (e.g., warfare and
health-care) and daily life (e.g., robotic vacuums). To
maximize the benefts of these interactions, human trust
in the system plays an important role (Lee and See,
2004; Sheridan and Parasuraman, 2005). More specifcally,
published studies have shown that human trust can be
improved by increasing the transparency of intelligent
systems’ decisions (Helldin, 2014; Mercado et al., 2016).
Chen et al. (2014) defnes transparency as “the descriptive quality of an interface pertaining to its abilities to
aŒord an operator’s comprehension about an intelligent
agent’s intent, performance, future plans, and reasoning
process.” Greater transparency allows humans to make
informed judgments and accordingly make better decisions. Nonetheless, very high levels of human trust are
not always desirable and can lead to humans trusting an
error-prone system. Moreover, high transparency requires
communicating more information to the human and can
thus increase the workload level of the human (Lyu et al.,
˜ This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Award No. 1548616. Any opinions, fndings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily refect the views of the
National Science Foundation.

2017). In turn, high levels of workload can lead to fatigue,
which can reduce the human’s performance (Bohua et al.,
2011). Therefore, we aim to design intelligent systems that
can respond to changes in human trust and workload to
achieve optimal performance.
Although researchers have developed various models of
human trust (Moe et al., 2008; Malik et al., 2009; Akash
et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2018) and workload (Wickens,
2008; Parasuraman, 2000), there does not exist a closedloop framework for infuencing human trust and workload
to improve human-machine collaboration. Furthermore,
published studies have shown that transparency aŒects
both human trust (Helldin, 2014; Mercado et al., 2016)
and workload (Lyu et al., 2017; Bohua et al., 2011) but
has not been systematically used to control trust-workload
behavior. Therefore, a fundamental gap remains in using
machine transparency to dynamically improve humanmachine collaboration.
In a companion paper titled “Improving Human-Machine
Collaboration Through Transparency-based Feedback –
Part I: Human Trust and Workload Model” (Akash et al.,
2018), we developed a partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP) framework for estimating human trust
and workload as it changes with machine transparency.
The model captures changes in trust and workload for
contexts that involve interaction between a human and an
intelligent decision-aid system. In this paper, we establish
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a systematic method for shaping the reward function for
the trust-workload POMDP model framework so as to
close the loop between human and machine. We design
and synthesize feedback control policies that vary machine
transparency based on solutions for two cases: 1) reward
functions designed to improve human trust and reduce
workload, and 2) reward functions designed to improve
a context-specifc performance metric along with trust
and workload. We implement these control policies in a
reconnaissance mission study in which human subjects are
aided by a virtual robotic assistant. Finally, we analyze the
performance of these two control policies against an openloop baseline.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on our POMDP model for trust-workload behavior. The proposed framework to obtain reward functions
for the trust-workload model is described in Section 3.
The algorithm used for determining the two sets of reward
functions along with a near-optimal control policy are presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes the reconnaissance
mission study used to test two feedback control policies.
Results and discussion are presented in Section 6, followed
by concluding statements in Section 7.
2. BACKGROUND
In the aforementioned companion paper (Akash et al.,
2018), we established a POMDP model for trust-workload
behavior of humans during interactions with an intelligent
decision-aid system. The model consists of a fnite set of
states,
T
S = [Trust, Workload ] ,
where both trust T and workload W can be either low ( ˜˜ )
or high ( ˜° ), that is, Trust ° {T˜ , T° } and Workload °
{W˜ , W° }. We defne a fnite set of actions
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but would ensure they would not be injured if danger
was present. Conversely, searching without the gear would
only take 5 seconds, but if danger was present, they
would be injured and a 2-minute recovery time penalty
would be applied. In order to assist the participant in
their decision-making, the robotic companion surveyed
each building frst and provided a recommendation as to
whether or not the protective gear was advised. In each
mission, a diœerent robot with a diœerent transparency
level provided the recommendation for each building. Data
from 79 participants was collected and used to estimate the
transition probability functions T (s˝ |s, a) and observation
probability functions O(o|s) for separate and independent
POMDP models for trust and workload. We refer the
reader to Part I of this paper (Akash et al., 2018) for the
parameter values of the estimated probability functions.
Here in Part II, we consider reward functions RT (s˝ |s, a)
and RW (s˝ |s, a) with respect to trust and workload, respectively, along with a discount factor  to fnd the
optimal control policy that varies machine transparency
to improve the human-machine collaboration.
3. REWARDS FOR TRUST-WORKLOAD POMDP
We use a general defnition of the reward function
R(s˝ |s, a), defned as the reward received for transitioning
from a state s to s˝ given an action a. A discounting
factor  is used to discount the future rewards so that
immediate rewards are preferred. An optimal control policy using transparency as the feedback variable maximizes
the expected total reward earned. In this section we defne
the rewards for the context of humans interacting with
intelligent decision-aid systems.
State Rewards: During a human-machine interaction,
we do not want the human to have low trust in the
machine. Therefore, we assign a reward of − (negative
reward implies a penalty) for transitioning to the state of
Low Trust T˜ from any existing state of trust given any
action. Furthermore, we want the human to avoid high
levels of workload; therefore we assign a reward of − for
transitioning to the state of High Workload W° . These
rewards can be represented as
RST (s˝ = T˜ |s, a) = −; s ° {T˜ , T° } and a ° A, (1)

A = [Recommendation, Experience, Transparency]T ,
where recommendation SA can be either Stimulus Absent
−
+
SA
or Stimulus Present SA
, experience E depends on the
reliability of the last recommendation which can be either
Faulty E − or Reliable E + , and transparency ˆ can be
either Low Transparency ˆL , Medium Transparency ˆM ,
or High Transparency ˆH . Finally, we defne a fnite set of
observations
T
O = [Compliance, Response Time] ,
where compliance C can be either Disagree C − or Agree
C + and response time RT can be either fast response time
RTF , medium response time RTM , or slow response time
RTS .

and
are the state reward functions for
Here,
the trust and workload models, respectively. The relative
values of  and  determine the relative importance of
trust and workload, respectively.

We collected human subject data using study adapted
from the literature in which human subjects were aided
by a virtual robotic assistant while completing a series
of reconnaissance missions. Participants interacted with
assistive robots to perform reconnaissance missions in
three diœerent locations. In each location, the participants
searched 14 buildings and classifed them as safe or unsafe
based on the absence or presence of danger, respectively.
Their goal was to successfully search all buildings as fast as
possible. Prior to entering each building, the participants
needed to decide if they would wear protective gear or
not. They were informed that searching a building with
the protective gear would take approximately 15 seconds

Performance Rewards: Apart from maintaining trust
and workload in human-machine collaborations, it is important to achieve the goals that are specifc to a given interaction or collaboration. Machines are never completely
reliable and are instead prone to errors and failures. Thus,
it is not always benefcial for the human to trust the
machine. Instead, in the context of a human being helped
by an intelligent decision-aid system, we want the human
to make correct decisions; in other words, we want the
human to comply with the system’s recommendation when
it is correct, and not comply when it is incorrect. In order
to enforce this in our framework, we introduce a penalty
when the human makes incorrect decisions.

RSW (s˝ = W° |s, a) = −;
RST

S
RW

s ° {W˜ , W° } and a ° A. (2)
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Table 1. Reliability characteristics of the
decision-aid system representing the probabilities of the assistive system’s inference given
the true situation.

True
Situation

Decision-aid System’s
Inference
Stimulus
Stimulus
−
+
Present SA
Absent SA
Stimulus
Absent S −

−°

°

Stimulus
Present S +

˛

−˛

Although we have defned the recommendation SA of
the decision-aid system based on its inference about the
situation, we also need to distinguish what the human
infers about the situation and what the true situation is.
For example, in the context of the reconnaissance mission
described earlier, it is possible for the recommendation
of the decision-aid system to indicate the presence of
danger but for the human to believe that the decision-aid
system is unreliable. In this situation, the human may infer
that there is no danger, when in fact danger is present.
We denote the true (or actual) absence or presence of
the stimulus as S ˜ {S − , S + }, the decision-aid system’s
−
+
inference or recommendation as SA ˜ {SA
, SA
}, and the
−
+
human’s inference as SH ˜ {SH , SH }. Here, ˜− and ˜+
represent absence and presence of stimulus, respectively.
We denote the probability of true presence of stimulus
Pr(S + ) := d and, therefore, Pr(S − ) = 1 − d. Furthermore,
an agent (decision-aid system or human) can make two
types of errors, namely, alpha-errors or beta-errors.
Defnition 1. An alpha-error is the error an agent makes
by inferring a true absence of the stimulus S − as the
+
+
presence of the stimulus (SA
or SH
).
Defnition 2. A beta-error is the error an agent makes by
inferring a true presence of the stimulus S + as the absence
−
−
of the stimulus (SA
or SH
).
In practice, the reliability with which a decision-aid system
makes correct predictions is a system characteristic and
known a priori ; therefore, we denote the probabilities of
the decision-aid system making a beta-error or alpha-error
− +
+ −
as Pr(SA
|S ) = ˝ and Pr(SA
|S ) = ˙ respectively. These
reliability characteristics of the decision-aid system are
summarized in Table 1.
In order to enforce penalties in our framework when the
human makes incorrect decisions (i.e., makes an error),
we assign a reward of −ˆ when the human makes an
alpha-error and a reward of −ˇ when the human makes
a beta-error. The relative values of ˆ and ˇ determine
the relative importance of alpha- and beta-errors made
by the human, respectively. It should be noted that an
error made by the human is dependent on whether or
not the decision-aid system made an error. A human can
make an error by either agreeing with the decision-aid
system’s erroneous recommendation or disagreeing with
the decision-aid system’s correct recommendation. These
rewards (penalties) are summarized in Table 2.
Until this point, we have defned these performance rewards in terms of the observations of our POMDP framework (i.e. human compliance) and the true situation. In

Table 2. Performance rewards based on errors
made by the human.
Human’s Inference

True
Situation
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Stimulus
−
Absent SH

Stimulus
+
Present SH

Stimulus
Absent S −

0

−˝

Stimulus
Present S +

−˙

0

a POMDP framework, the reward function must be defned in the form R(s° |s, a). Therefore, we transform these
performance rewards to derive the expected performance
rewards for transitioning to state s° ˜ {T˛ , T˝ } from any
°
state s ˜ {T˛ , T˝ } given action a ˜ A, i.e., RP
T (s |a).
Here, we only consider states of trust (and not workload)
because compliance is only dependent on trust behavior
in our independent models of human trust and workload.
Since the human’s decision is dependent on their trust
level and the recommendation provided by the decisionaid system, we only consider the next state s° and the
system’s recommendation SA for calculating the expected
reward. Therefore,
°
T
P °
RP
(3)
T (s |s, a = [SA , E,  ] ) = RT (s |SA ) .
Proposition 1. Given a reward function r : S × SH  R
defned in terms of true absence or presence of stimulus
−
+
S ˜ {S − , S + } and the human’s inference SH ˜ {SH
, SH
}
as shown in Table 2, an equivalent standard reward func°
°
tion in the form RP
T (s |SA ) calculated as E[r|s , SA ] is
given by
−
−
+
RP
T (T˛ |SA ) = −OT (C |T˛ )(1 − )ˆ − OT (C |T˛ )ˇ ,
−
−
+
RP
T (T˝ |SA ) = −OT (C |T˝ )(1 − )ˆ − OT (C |T˝ )ˇ ,

+
−
+
RP
T (T˛ |SA ) = −OT (C |T˛ )(1 − µ)ˇ − OT (C |T˛ )µˆ ,

+
−
+
RP
T (T˝ |SA ) = −OT (C |T˝ )(1 − µ)ˇ − OT (C |T˝ )µˆ ,
(4)
where OT (o|s) is the observation probability function,
−
E[ ˜] is the expected value of ˜ ,  := Pr(S + |SA
), and
− +
µ := Pr(S |SA ).

We can calculate  and µ from Table 1 using Bayes’
theorem as
˝d
˙(1 − d)
=
, µ=
. (5)
˝d + (1 − ˙)(1 − d)
˙(1 − d) + (1 − ˝)d

Proof. We show the proof for the frst reward function
−
. The other three
in (4), where s° = T˛ and SA = SA
equations can be proved similarly. Using the law of total
probability over a disjoint set C, we get
−
−
RP
T (T˛ |SA ) = E[r|T˛ , SA ]
˜
−
−
(6)
=
Pr(C|T˛ , SA
)E[r|C, T˛ , SA
] .
C

Compliance C ˜ {C − , C + } is only dependent on the trust
state T and not on the decision-aid system’s recommendation SA . Similarly, the performance rewards we defned
are only dependent on the human’s decision SH and the
actual situation S (and not on the human trust state T ).
Therefore, (6) can be simplifed as
˜
−
−
RP
Pr(C|T˛ )E[r|C, SA
] .
T (T˛ |SA ) =
(7)
C
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When C = C − , the human disagreeing C − to a recommen−
dation of stimulus absent SA
is equivalent to the human
+
; therefore,
inferring the situation as stimulus present SH
we can write
−
+
−
] = E[r|SH
, SA
]
E[r|C − , SA
˜
+
=
Pr(S|S , S − )E[r|S, S + , S − ] . (8)
H

A

H

A

S

Since the true situation S is independent of the human’s
inference SH , and the reward r is only dependent on the
true situation S and the human’s inference SH ,
˜
−
+
−
)E[r|S, SH
]
]=
Pr(S|SA
E[r|C − , SA
(9)
S
= −(1 − ˆ)ˇ .
Similarly, we derive
−
(10)
] = −ˆ˘ .
E[r|C + , SA
Using (7),(9), and (10), we get
−
−
+
RP
T (T° |SA ) = −OT (C |T° )(1 − ˆ)ˇ − OT (C |T° )ˆ˘ . ˜
Remark 1. This result can be extended to the case when
−
)
the rewards for making correct decisions, i.e., r(S − , SH
+
+
and r(S , SH ) are non-zero.
Therefore, using (1) and (4), the cumulative reward for
trust is RT = RST + RTP and using (2), the reward for
S
. Finally, to select an appropriate
workload is RW = RW
discount factor  we consider the number of trials per
mission in our study, i.e., N = 14. We select the discount
factor  such that the reward of the 14th trial has a weight
of e−1 ; such a value of  can be approximated as
N
=
= 0.933
(11)
N +1
With this reward function and discount factor, we calculate the solution for the POMDP model in the next section.
4. POMDP SOLUTION
To determine the optimal transparency for a given humanmachine interaction, we solve the combined POMDP
model for trust and workload. Although the exact optimal solution for a POMDP can be obtained using value
iteration, the time complexity of solving POMDP value
iteration is exponential in actions and observations. Considering that one may need to defne even larger sets of
actions and observations for a real scenario, using exact
value iteration is not feasible. Therefore, we use a greedy
approach called the Q-MDP method to obtain a nearoptimal solution (Cassandra et al., 1994). This involves
solving the underlying MDP to obtain the Q-function
QMDP : S × A ˇ R and choosing the action based on
the current belief state as˜
b(s)QMDP (s, a) ,
(12)
a˛ = argmax
a

s˝S

where the belief state b(s) can be iteratively calculated as
°
Pr(o|sˆ , a)
Pr(sˆ |s, a)b(s)
s˝S
°
bˆ (sˆ ) = Pr(sˆ |o, a, b) = °
.
Pr(sˆ |s, a)b(s)
Pr(o|sˆ , a)
s˜ ˝S

s˝S

(13)
Fundamentally, the Q-MDP method fnds the optimal
solution assuming that the POMDP were to become observable after the next action. The underlying MDP can
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be solved directly using value iterations to obtain the
Q-function (Puterman, 2014). However, the solution obtained assumes that the decision-aid system can take any
action a ˘ A, while in this case, the system can only
control the transparency because the recommendation and
experience depend on the true situation and machine reliability. In other words, the transparency is the controllable action and the recommendation S and experience
E are uncontrollable actions; the latter are analogous to
disturbance inputs in a typical control system. In order
to accommodate uncontrollable actions during value iterations, we calculate the expected Q-function that is
only dependent on the controllable action considering the
probabilities of the uncontrollable actions. We calculate an
intermediate Q-function of the form Q : S × ˇ R and
iterate (14) until convergence to obtain QMDP (s, a).
˜
T (sˆ |s, a) (R(sˆ |s, a) + V (sˆ ))
QMDP (s, a) =
Q (s, ) =

s˜ ˝S

˜

Pr(SA , E)QMDP (s, a = [SA , E, ])

SA ,E

V (s) = max Q (s, )


(14)
−
+
{SA
, SA
}

−

+

and E ˘ {E , E }. Furthermore,
Here, SA ˘
the present recommendation SA and experience E due to
the reliability of the last recommendation are independent,
that is, Pr(SA , E) = Pr(SA ) Pr(E). Pr(SA ) and Pr(E) can
be calculated as
−
) = d + (1 − )(1 − d) ,
Pr(SA
+
Pr(SA ) = 1 − Pr(S − ) ,
(15)
Pr(E − ) = (1 − d) + d ,
Pr(E + ) = 1 − Pr(E − ) .
For the human subject study described in this paper,
d = 0.5,  = 0.2, and = 0.2. For implementation, once
S and E are known in a trial, near-optimal transparency
˛
can be determined as
˜
˛
= argmax
b(s)QMDP (s, a = [SA , E, ]) .
(16)


s˝S

We now obtain the solutions for two sets of reward
functions.
4.1 Case 1: Considering State Rewards Only

We frst consider only state rewards with equal importance
given to trust and workload. Therefore, the parameters
of the reward function are:
= 1,  = 1, ˇ = 0, and
˘ = 0. The solutions are represented in Fig. 1. We frst
consider the case when the recommendation indicates no
−
) as shown in Fig. 1(a) and
danger (Stimulus Absent SA
1(b). This case represents a high risk situation in that
it can cause a human to make beta-errors and can lead
to injury, resulting in a penalty of 2 minutes. When Low
Trust T° is more probable, high transparency should be
used to increase trust. However, high transparency should
be avoided at high workload as shown in Fig. 1(b). When
+
the recommendation indicates danger SA
(see Fig. 1(c)
and 1(d)), low transparency is better at maintaining high
trust and low workload as the associated risk is low.
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1

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜
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0.5

0
0

0.5

˜

Pr High Trust T˜

0.5

0
0.5

˜

Pr High Trust T˜

0.5
˜
° 1
Pr High Trust T˜

−
(b) SA = SA
, E = E+

0.5

0
0

0.5
˜
° 1
Pr High Trust T˜

+
(d) SA = SA
, E = E+

□ TM

-

TH

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜

Fig. 1. Solution considering state rewards only with ˜ = 1,
° = 1, ˛ = 0, and ˝ = 0.
1

0.5

0
0

0.5

0
0

0.5

0
0.5
˜
° 1
Pr High Trust T˜

+
(c) SA = SA
, E = E−

□ TL

0.5
˜
° 1
Pr High Trust T˜

−
(b) SA = SA
, E = E+

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜

1

0

1

0.5
˜
° 1
Pr High Trust T˜

−
(a) SA = SA
, E = E−

1

0.5

0
0

0.5
˜
° 1
Pr High Trust T˜

+
(d) SA = SA
, E = E+

□ TM

In the next section, these solutions are used to implement
transparency-based feedback based on the participant’s
current trust and workload in a reconnaissance mission
study.
5. HUMAN SUBJECT STUDY

1

° 1

+
(c) SA = SA
, E = E−

□ TL

0
0

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜

˜
°
Pr High Workload W˜

1

0

0.5

° 1

−
(a) SA = SA
, E = E−

+
mendation indicates danger SA
(see Fig. 2(c) and 2(d)),
lower transparencies are more e—ective for maintaining
high trust and low workload as the associated risk is low.

1

-

TH

Fig. 2. Solution considering state and performance rewards
with ˜ = 1, ° = 1, ˛ = 25, and ˝ = 250.
4.2 Case 2: Considering State and Performance Rewards
We now consider performance rewards along with state
rewards with higher weights given to performance. We also
penalize the human more for making beta-errors than for
making alpha-errors as those have greater consequences
in the specifc context considered in our human subject
study. Therefore, the parameters for the reward function
are: ˜ = 1, ° = 1, ˛ = 25, and ˝ = 250. The solutions are
presented in Fig. 2.
We frst consider the high risk case when the recommen−
dation indicates no danger SA
(see Fig. 2(a) and 2(b)).
The solution aims to avoid over-trust by providing higher
levels of transparency when high trust is more probable.
This allows the human to make a more informed choice
and avoid the chances of a beta-error. When the recom-

The goal of the following human subject study is to experimentally validate the performance of the proposed control
policy for transparency-based feedback in interactions between humans and an intelligent decision-aid system. The
experiment described below is identical to that used in our
companion paper but with transparency controlled using
feedback between the machine and human based on the
solution of the POMDP.
Stimuli and Procedure: A within-subjects study was
performed in which participants were told they would
interact with assistive robots to perform reconnaissance
missions in three di—erent locations. In each location, the
participant searched 14 buildings and classifed them as
safe or unsafe based on the presence of danger. In order
to aid in their decision, a robotic companion surveyed
each building frst and provided a recommendation on
whether or not protective gear was advised. Each robot
was equipped with a camera to detect the presence of
gunmen and a chemical sensor to detect chemicals.
In the frst mission, the robot reported to the human
with a transparency level randomly chosen from the three
levels. Each transparency level was chosen approximately
an equal number of times. This acted as a baseline case
against which the closed-loop interactions could be compared. In the subsequent two missions, the machine determined the transparency with which to communicate to the
human based on each of the POMDP solutions described
in Section 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. The choice of which
POMDP solution (Case 1 or Case 2) to apply in mission
2 versus 3 was randomized to avoid ordering e—ects.
Partici ants: Eighty-one participants (36 males and 45
females) recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (Amazon, 2005), ranging in age from 24-71 (mean 39.68 and
standard deviation 10.76) participated in the study. The
compensation was $1.50 for their participation, and each
participant electronically provided their consent. The Institutional Review Board at Purdue University approved
the study.
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Using the collected human subject data, we defne fve
metrics to quantify and evaluate each participant’s performance in both the baseline case as well as in the
cases that included transparency-based feedback. We removed outlying values for each of the metrics determined by the interquartile range (IQR) rule (the 1.5×IQR
rule) (Rousseeuw and Hubert, 2011). We use repeated
measures one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests to
determine whether the use of feedback had any signifcant
e—ect on these metrics. Post hoc analyses are conducted if

10
9

Baseline

Case 1
Control Policy

Case 2

1

Fig. 3. Eˇect of feedback control policies on the number of
compliant trials. Error bars represent standard error
of the mean.
the signifcant ANOVA F test is obtained. Specifcally, we
conduct paired t-tests on all possible pairwise contrasts.
1. Number of compliant trials. The number of compliant trials is defned as the number of trials in which a participant agreed with the robot’s recommendation. Agreeing with the robot is an indicator of the participant’s trust
level with more compliant trials implying higher trust.
Figure 3 shows the eˇect of using a feedback control policy
on the number of compliant trials. An ANOVA test showed
that the use of feedback did not have a signifcant eˇect
on the number of compliant trials, F (2, 158) = 1.8080,
p = 0.1673. Nonetheless, we observe fewer compliant trials
when the control policy based on the Case 2 rewards was
used as compared to that of the Case 1 rewards and the
baseline case. In other words, the control policy based on
the Case 2 rewards decreased the trust of participants.
This is expected as participants needed to distrust the
robot in order to avoid injuries when the robot made an
erroneous recommendation.
2. Average response time. The average response time
is defned as the average time a participant took to
respond to the robot’s recommendation. Response time
is an indicator of the participant’s workload, with higher
response time implying higher workload. Figure 4 shows
the eˇect of the use of a feedback control policy on the
average response time. An ANOVA test showed that the
use of feedback had a signifcant eˇect on average response
time, F (2, 126) = 20.3223, p ˜ 0.0000. Specifcally, the
average response time with the use of control policy
based on the Case 2 rewards was signifcantly lower as
compared to that of the baseline case (p = 0.0020), but was
signifcantly higher as compared to that of Case 1 rewards
(p = 0.0008). This shows that both control policies were
able to reduce the workload as compared to the baseline
case. However, the control policy based on Case 2 rewards
was worse at reducing the workload as compared to the
Case 1 rewards. This is expected as participants saw a
higher transparency user interface more often in Case 2
as recommended by the performance and state rewarddependent control policy.
3. Number of injured trials. The number of injured
trials is defned as the number of trials in which a participant made beta-errors and received a penalty of 2 minutes.
Figure 5 shows the eˇect of the use of a feedback control
policy on the number of injured trials. An ANOVA test
showed that the use of feedback had a signifcant eˇect
on the number of injured trials, F (2, 134) = 15.7611, p ˜
0.0000. Specifcally, the number of injured trials decreased
signifcantly when the control policy based on the Case 1
rewards was used as compared to that of the baseline
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Fig. 4. Eˇect of various feedback control policies on the
average response time of the participants after receiving robot’s recommendation. Error bars represent
standard error of the mean.
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Fig. 5. Eˇect of various feedback control policies on the
number of trials participants got injured due to betaerrors. Error bars represent standard error of the
mean.
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Fig. 6. Eˇect of various feedback control policies on the
number of correct decisions made by participants.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
(p = 0.0084). Furthermore, the number of injured trials
decreased signifcantly for Case 2 rewards as compared
to Case 1 rewards (p = 0.0017). This shows that both
the control policies were able to signifcantly reduce betaerrors made by the participants. Moreover, the control policy based on the Case 2 rewards was signifcantly better in
reducing the beta-errors made by the participants. This is
expected as the control policy based on the Case 2 rewards
prioritized performance rewards with a high penalty for
beta-errors.
4. Number of correct decisions. The number of correct
decisions is defned as the number of correct decisions
made by the participants, i.e., the trials in which they
avoid both alpha- and beta-errors. Figure 6 shows the
eˇect of the use of a feedback control policy on the number
of correct decisions. An ANOVA test showed that the use
of feedback did not have a signifcant eˇect on the number
of correct decisions, F (2, 156) = 0.32349, p = 0.7241.
5. Total mission time. The total mission time is
defned as the total time a participant took to complete
the mission, which includes lost time due to alpha-errors
(15 seconds) and beta-errors (2 minutes) made by the
participants along with their response times. This is an
overall indicator of the participants’ performance in the
mission as their objective was to complete the mission in
the least possible time. Figure 7 shows the eˇect of the
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ering coupled trust-workload dynamics and validating it
in other contexts.
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Fig. 7. Eˇect of various feedback control policies on the
total mission time. Error bars represent standard
error of the mean.
use of a feedback control policy on the total mission time.
An ANOVA test showed that the use of feedback had a
signifcant eˇect on the total mission time, F (2, 128) =
9.2173, p = 0.0002. Specifcally, we observe a signifcantly
lower total mission time as compared to the baseline case
with the control policy based on Case 1 rewards (p =
0.0438) and Case 2 rewards (p = 0.0002). The decrease
in the total mission time was more apparent using the
control policy based on the Case 2 rewards.
Though published studies have shown that transparency
a°ects both human trust (Helldin, 2014; Mercado et al.,
2016) and workload (Lyu et al., 2017; Bohua et al.,
2011), we have used it to systematically control the trustworkload behavior of humans. We observe that the control
policy based on the Case 1 rewards, which focused on
improving human trust and reducing workload, was not
able to increase participants compliance but was better at
reducing their response time. However, the control policy
based on the Case 2 rewards was signifcantly better at
reducing the beta-errors made by human and at improving the overall performance. Therefore, we conclude that
when designing intelligent systems to aˇect human trustworkload behavior, overall improvement in the collaborative performance should be considered in addition to objectives related to increased trust and decreased workload.
7. CONCLUSION
To attain improved human-machine collaboration, it is
necessary for autonomous systems to infer human trust
and workload and respond accordingly. In turn, autonomous systems require models that capture both human trust and workload dynamics. In a companion paper,
we developed a trust-workload POMDP model framework
that captured changes in human trust and workload for
contexts that involve interaction between a human and an
intelligent decision-aid system. In this paper, we defned
intuitive reward functions and showed that these could
be readily transformed for integration with the proposed
POMDP model. We synthesized a near-optimal control
policy using transparency as the feedback variable based
on solutions for two cases: 1) increasing human trust and
reducing workload, 2) improving overall performance along
with the aforementioned objectives for trust and workload.
We implemented these solutions in a reconnaissance mission study in which human subjects were aided by a virtual
robotic assistant. We found that it is not always benefcial
to increase trust; instead, the control objective should be
to optimize a context-specifc performance objective when
designing intelligent decision-aid systems that infuence
trust-workload behavior. Future work will include consid-

The authors sincerely acknowledge the contribution of
Katelyn Polson in the experiment design and collection
of human subject data.
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